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Abstract 
We present an overview of the financial structure of the enlarged European Union 
with 25 countries. We start by describing the financial system development in all 
member states since 1995, and then compare the structure between the old and new 
countries. Using financial measures we document the prevailing substantial 
differences in the financial structure between new and old member states after the 
enlargement in 2004. Finally, we compare the financial structures of an enlarged EU 
with those of the United States and Japan. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Despite the political and economic convergence in the European Union (EU-25), the 
financial structures of different members remain diverse. This paper compares the 
development of EU-25 countries’ financial structures from 1995-2004. We stress that 
the enlargement of the EU in May 2004, by changing the institutional setting, has 
reduced some divergences across Europe, but increased others. However, it has not 
significantly altered the structure of the European financial system. There is 
significant inertia with regard to financial structure: important and persistent 
transformations of financial systems can take more than a decade. On the other hand 
convergence in the financial systems of EU-25 countries is important, in particular for 
the future prospects of an eventual enlargement of the European Monetary Union 
because a common monetary policy may be hard to implement when the financial 
structures of member states are diverse.  
We start our analysis in section 2, by outlining the economic background of 
the enlarged European Union (EU-25) and the main characteristics of its financial 
system. In section 3 we describe the banking system, while in section 4 we focus on 
the development of capital markets. In section 5 we present other important players in 
the financial system, such as the insurance industry and pension and investment funds. 
Finally, section 6 concludes by summarizing and making a comparison of the EU-25 
financial system with that in the US and Japan. 
2. THE BACKGROUND 
The New Member States (NMS), except Cyprus and Malta, have been engaged in a 
transition process involving institutional and structural changes that have turned 
former planned economies into market economies. The main economic indicators still 
show that significant differences exist between NMS and Old Member States (OMS). 
The level of financial development, understood as the size and efficiency of the 
sector, may strongly affect the pace of future economic growth1.
                                                 
1 For a survey of the theory and empirical research on finance and growth, see Levine (1997). 
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In terms of GDP the NMS are rather small compared to the OMS. At the end 
of 2004 the GDP at current exchange rates of the NMS was €441 billion or only 5 per 
cent of the value of that of OMS countries with €9,307 billion in 2004 (Figure 1). 
The average growth rate has been higher in the NMS than in the OMS over the 
years 1995-2004. As a result the NMS have made substantial progress catching up in 
real terms and have reached 54 per cent of the EU-25 average purchasing power per 
capita income in 2004. An exception is the Czech Republic, which had the lowest 
growth rate among the NMS. The country underwent a severe financial crisis caused 
by bad loan problems in 1996 (Bonin and Wachtel, 2004). The case of the Czech 
Republic, however, confirms the theoretical prediction that countries’ economic 
growth and financial system development are closely linked. Thus, we believe that the 
financial system development of the EU-25 is essential for economic growth and for 
further convergence of the market structures within the EU-25. 
The structure of the European financial system has changed significantly in 
the last few years. This change can mainly be attributed to the liberalization of 
international capital movements in order to create a common regulatory framework 
for the provision of financial services as part of the European Internal Market. 
In comparison with the NMS, the OMS have a relatively deep and broad 
financial services industry, with total assets amounting to 558 per cent of GDP in 
2002, while in the NMS it was only 170 per cent (Figure 2). 
Credit institutions lead the EU-25 financial system, with a relative share in 
total assets of 52 per cent in the OMS and 73 per cent in the NMS. Apparently, the 
EU-25 financial structure is mainly bank based, yet in some member states capital 
markets are also quite important. In the OMS other financial intermediaries have been 
gaining in importance in the last decade, but their position compared to credit 
institutions is still relatively small in terms of assets to GDP. Although the dominance 
of credit institutions has been declining in the NMS too, the role of insurance 
companies, investment funds and pension funds is still underdeveloped in comparison 
to the OMS. Therefore, credit institutions followed by capital markets are the main 
elements of the European financial system. Hence, in the next two sections we will 
focus on the banking system and the capital markets in the EU-25. 
Within the EU-25 national differences in financial structures are significant. In 
the OMS, the domestic credit to GDP ratio stood at 120 per cent in 2004, compared to 
a stock market capitalisation to GDP ratio of around 91 per cent (Figure 3). NMS 
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have significantly smaller credit to GDP and stock market capitalisation ratios. Bank 
based financial structures remain predominant within the EU-25, the exceptions being 
the United Kingdom and since recently Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands, which 
have moved towards market based financial systems. 
Rajan and Zingales (2003) analyzed European financial system characteristics 
over the last two decades. Based on their findings they came to the conclusion that in 
the last two decades the EU-25 financial system moved away from a bank based 
towards a market based financial system. They identified the process of monetary and 
financial integration as the underlying cause of these changes. Rajan and Zingales 
(2003) argue therefore that the ongoing process will likely result in the evolution of a 
more market based system over time. 
Differences in financial structure are often related to divergences in countries’ 
respective legal systems (La Porta et al, 1998). According to this theoretical 
prediction, a high degree of investor protection should help the development of stock 
markets. Conversely, a high degree of creditors’ rights protection should encourage 
bank lending. 
In the NMS improvements in the domestic legal system in the 1990s have 
reduced  credit risk, thereby promoting credit supply since then. Apart from this, in 
the EU-25 the index of creditors’ rights and anti-director rights protection seems not 
to be positively related to bank credit and market capitalization, respectively (Figure 
4). 
This situation may be explained by a weak and costly enforcement of the 
existing laws in some of the member states, especially in the NMS. In the OMS the 
time needed to enforce a contract takes on average 221 days, while on average 305 
days are needed in the NMS. Additionally the average cost of enforcing a contract as 
a percentage of GNI per capita is 4.45 per cent in the OMS against 5.42 per cent in 
NMS (Allen et al., 2005). Those numbers disclose that even as NMS have introduced 
high quality legal protection, they may not influence financial system development, as 
their enforcement remains weak and costly. 
Law enforcement may play an even greater role in the future as further 
financial integration may result in a convergence of the legal protection of 
shareholders and creditors within the EU-25. The past experience shows that 
harmonization, integration and enforcement of the regulations affecting the financial 
services industry may take a long time. Therefore differences in legal protection and 
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as a consequence in financial structures may prevail for some time in the EU-25, yet 
we may expect a further integration of laws and financial structures in the long run. 
3. THE BANKING SYSTEM 
As already shown, the financial system of the EU-25 is mainly bank based, due to the 
prominent role of credit institutions (CI) in most member states. In terms of GDP, 
bank assets in the OMS reached 219 per cent in 2004, an increase of 17 per cent 
compared with 1995 (Table 1). 
Changes in NMS bank assets were more significant and the ratio reached 85 
per cent in 2004, an increase of 27 per cent since 1995. The difference in the ratio 
between the OMS and NMS shows a potential for development and explains the large 
amount of foreign bank entry in the NMS (Dermine, 2005). Data show also that credit 
and deposits to GDP have more than doubled over the last decade in many EU-25 
countries. This means that EU-25 credit institutions were able to retain their position 
relative to other financial intermediaries despite the fierce competition; they even 
increased their importance in most economies. Only in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia did the role of credit not increase; this was caused by the protracted 
restructuring of bad loans accumulated earlier. 
Credit institutions responded to the structural changes in the financial sector 
and increased competition by consolidating their activities in order to increase in size 
and scope. This affected all types of credit institutions, including cooperative banks 
and mutual savings banks (Goddard et al., 2001). The average number of credit 
institutions fell from 504 in 1997 to 334 in 2004, a decrease of 34 per cent compared 
with 1997 (Table 2). 
The decrease was mainly caused by a high level of mergers and acquisitions 
within the EU. The large number of M&A transactions may also be a sign of 
convergence and integration of bank market structures of the EU-25 (Allen and Song, 
2005). Within the EU-25 438 transactions were reported involving at least one credit 
institution over the period 2001-2004, 68 per cent involved within border transactions, 
26 per cent transactions within the European Economic Area (EEA)3, and 6 per cent 
of deals were with third countries outside the EEA. While in the OMS 76 per cent of 
transactions were domestic, in the NMS 62 per cent of deals were cross-border 
                                                 
3 The EEA comprises the EU, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. 
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transactions. As a result there are significant cross-country differences in the foreign 
presence in the local banking sector within the EU-25. 
On average 70 per cent of NMS total banking assets were controlled by 
foreign institutions in 2004, against only 19 per cent in the OMS. In addition foreign 
presence is notably high, over 90 per cent, in some of the NMS, while in some of the 
OMS it remains below 10 per cent of total assets. 
Divergence in foreign ownership has a strong impact on the market structure 
in the EU. Davis and De Bandt (1999) provided evidence of monopolistic competition 
in a variety of European banking markets in the mid-1990s. They noted that the 
competitive environment in the French, German and Italian banking markets still lags 
behind that in the US banking sector. Data show that these markets have few outside 
competitors even after more than a decade of EMU. 
Significant M&A activity and a downward trend in the number of credit 
institutions has significantly increased the level of concentration in local markets. On 
average, the five largest institutions’ share of total bank assets (CR-5) amounted to 45 
per cent in the EU-25 in 2004, up from 33 per cent in 1997. In the OMS a similar 
trend is also visible from the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI), which rose from 370 
in 1997 to 662 in 2004. In the NMS the HHI declined as a result of increased 
competition caused by foreign entry and a decrease of market share of former state 
owned banks. In general, however, in NMS concentration remains high and the CR5 
ratio varies between 50 per cent and 99 per cent. Moreover in some member states the 
HHI coefficient also exceeds the 2000 point high level concentration threshold. 
An indication that the consolidation process and high concentration have not 
adversely affected competitive conditions in the EU-25 banking industry is the 
decline in net interest margins (NIM) (Table 3). 
Concentration and margins are negatively related. In the NMS margins have 
significantly decreased despite a huge rise in concentration. In addition some of the 
countries with a high level of concentration have reported the lowest net interest 
margins within the EU-25. Apparently, concentration ratios do not necessarily reflect 
competitive conditions in the EU-25 banking sector. 
The fall in interest margins was compensated for by a decrease in overhead 
costs of credit institutions. In the OMS the average overhead ratio was 1.58 per cent 
in 2003 and had decreased by 13 per cent since 1997. The average ratio of overhead 
costs to total assets in the NMS was double that of the OMS, at 2.99 per cent in 2003, 
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yet it had decreased already by 19 per cent since 1997. These differences suggest 
considerable scale inefficiencies and large potential for future improvement in the 
NMS banking industry. 
The deterioration of interest margins and high overhead costs was responsible 
for the fact that the average cost-to-income ratio in the NMS, at 63.59 per cent, 
exceeded that of OMS. While in the NMS the average cost-to-income ratio slightly 
increased, in the OMS there has been an increase in efficiency. In the OMS the 
average cost-to-income ratio fell from 62.23 per cent in 1997 to 60.69 per cent in 
2003. 
The trends in income and costs are reflected in the data for profitability. 
However, the results for return on assets (ROA) present a quite mixed picture within 
the EU. The overall ROA in the EU-25 decreased moderately, to 0.84 per cent in 2003 
from 0.90 per cent in 1997. On average there was, both in the OMS and NMS, a 
downward trend in profitability. Given that the level of return in NMS countries was 
quite high the decline is understandable, while in the OMS the decrease may be 
related to the worsening of macroeconomic conditions. The downward trend in bank 
performance also reflects increased competition in the financial sector despite the 
overall fall in the number of credit institutions. However, the ratio shows a significant 
cross-country variability within the EU-25.  
Concluding, even if the European financial system is mainly bank based, there 
are significant cross-country differences, especially between the OMS and NMS. In 
the OMS the number of credit institutions is larger and thus the level of concentration 
is lower than in the NMS despite the continuing consolidation trend. In the last decade 
in the NMS most of the M&A transactions were cross-border, while in the OMS they 
were mainly domestic. As a consequence the level of foreign ownership in the NMS 
is significant, while in the OMS it remains moderately low. In general, foreign 
ownership had a positive impact on the risk management and performance of 
domestic credit institutions, as well as on the stability of the NMS financial systems.  
Trends in the structure of the banking industry are reflected in the performance 
of credit institutions. While interest margins remained higher in the NMS over the 
period 1997-2003, the overhead costs were significantly lower in the OMS. Trends in 
performance of credit institutions suggest that the structural changes described above 
have not dampened competition. Differences in the credit institutions’ performance 
reflect the persisting potential for development in the NMS, which has attracted 
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foreign banks in the past. However, in the long term foreign banks’ expectations 
about local bank profitability may be too high, which could induce them to compete 
aggressively on the local market (Dermine, 2005). Besides a shift from subsidiaries 
into branches may present quite a challenge for local and host supervisors. A foreign 
branch may have systemic importance in the host country even though it often 
represents only a modest share of a foreign credit institution’s total operations. As a 
consequence potential conflicts may emerge as far as country controls in supervision 
and responsibility in safeguarding financial stability are concerned. While, we expect 
a convergence in performance and later on also of the structures of the EU-25 banking 
industry, we stress that enhanced coordination, regulation and information-sharing 
within the integrated financial system are needed in order to prevent eventual cross-
border spillovers due to bank failures. 
4. THE CAPITAL MARKETS 
In transition economies the privatization of former state-owned companies has 
induced the development of equity markets: that’s how the first stock exchanges 
appeared in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland in 1991. The further 
development of stock markets was strongly influenced by the privatization strategies 
of the government in individual countries. A strategy of mass privatization schemes 
was employed in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Lithuania. In these countries the 
stock markets quickly comprised a large number of companies. However, the extent 
of the equity markets restrained their liquidity. In addition the widespread ownership 
limited transparency and the enforcement of corporate governance mechanisms. Thus, 
few companies were traded and most companies were later delisted. As an example in 
the Czech Republic 81 per cent of companies were delisted between 1995 and 1997 
and the number of listed companies declined from 1,716 in 1995 to 55 in 2004. 
A different strategy to privatization and stock market development was 
adopted in Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Slovenia. In these countries the 
government decided to privatize only financially sound and recognized companies via 
the stock market. In addition minority stakes in the privatized companies were often 
sold prior to the initial public offering to a foreign strategic investor. This provided 
additional security for the government for the success for the planned public offer and 
guaranteed also a higher price for the remaining shares. As a result, the equity markets 
in those countries have been growing gradually and provided adequate liquidity for 
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the listed companies. In Poland, in contrast to the Czech Republic, the number of 
listed companies grew steadily from 9 at the end of 1991 to 250 in 2004. However, 
many of those companies are currently closely held by strategic investors and 
therefore their equity is not always liquid. Thus, even if some market development 
has emerged, stock exchanges are still not very developed in Central and Eastern 
European countries. In fact, when we look at the average size of the stock exchange in 
NMS it amounts to a third of that of OMS. 
Market size is rather homogeneous in NMS: the market is not very large in 
these countries (Figure 5). The evidence for OMS is more scattered, taking into 
account the different historical developments of all countries concerned. In those 
countries with a less developed stock market the ratio of market capitalization to GDP 
has risen a lot in the last decade. This is particularly true for NMS. For Finland it is 
due to the market capitalization of Nokia, which had astonishingly high values in the 
period 1999-2001. Now that Nokia’s shares values are to a more customary level, 
Finnish stock market capitalization is still high, but in line with the relatively largest 
European stock exchanges. The same pattern has been observed for Cyprus over the 
same period (1999-2001). 
Considering the last decade as a whole, the largest European stock exchange 
markets are in Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Finland and 
Sweden. The London Stock Exchange is in absolute terms the largest in Europe; the 
Amsterdam stock exchange is large both in absolute and relative terms. On the other 
hand, in absolute values the stock exchange is not very large in Luxembourg, but, 
compared to GDP, it is the largest in Europe. The Wiener Börse is particularly small 
and this is probably due to the centrality of banks in the Austrian financial system. 
Among the new accession countries only Cyprus and the Check Republic seem to 
have a market size comparable to previous EU-25 members when looking at the 
period 1995-2004. 
On average in the last decade the most active markets have been the London 
and the Amsterdam stock exchanges (Figure 6). Transactions volumes are high in 
Spain, Finland and Sweden too. Despite its large size, Luxembourg has a very idle 
market, even less than the Wiener Börse. In NMS markets have very small trading 
volumes; the Czech Republic and Hungary are the only exceptions: enlarging stock 
exchanges seems to have been easier than having dynamic ones. Almost all markets 
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have recorded a peak in activity in 2000; after this exceptional year they all have 
returned to a stable level. Intra-group differences are higher for OMS. 
Another important part of the domestic capital market is the market for debt 
securities. In the EU-25 the size of the domestic debt securities market was on 
average 107.6 per cent GDP in the period examined (Figure 7). 
Debt securities markets have been growing much faster in NMS than in OMS 
over the period 1995-2004. However, the debt market in the NMS is still three times 
smaller than that of OMS with an average of 67 per cent of GDP and 146 per cent of 
GDP at the end of 2004, respectively. The most developed domestic bond markets 
were in Denmark, Italy and Belgium within the OMS4, and in Malta, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Cyprus among the NMS. 
As we did with shares, we want to examine activity in bond trading together 
with the size of the market. NMS have almost no bond trading: positive trade values 
are recorded for Malta and Hungary, but these are quite small and much lower than 
the trading volumes in OMS. Data for OMS are more diverse: the stock exchanges 
that have a higher activity in bonds are located in Denmark, Sweden and Italy. 
Together with the London stock exchange and the Amsterdam stock exchange, these 
are the only markets which record any significant activity in bonds. For Italy the 
reported average is influenced by the large values traded in 1996-1998; the ratio is 
quite low in recent years. In the late 1990s the highest trade volumes of bonds were 
recorded and these years were characterized by high volatility. In recent years, trade 
volumes are more stable and their average level is quite low. 
At first sight the EU-25 domestic debt securities market seems to be more 
developed than the equity market: however, the structure of the EU-25 debt markets 
as a whole is dominated by bonds issued by governments. 
The recent increase in issuance of government debt instruments primarily 
reflects the financing of fiscal imbalances of member states. At the end of 2004 the 
value of domestic government securities as a share of GDP was 77 per cent for the 
EU, while for the OMS it was 82 per cent and 62 per cent for the NMS.  
                                                 
4 The debt markets of Luxembourg and the United Kingdom seem small because we are only taking 
into account domestic securities. In fact the total bond market sizes are doubled in these countries, and 
hence are the greatest in EU-25, if international bonds are taken into account. 
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The amount outstanding of privately issued debt in the EU-25 is still relatively 
modest, while the issuance of bonds by financial institutions has increased from 41 
per cent of GDP in 1995 to 47 per cent in 2004. The difference in importance of the 
financial institutions debt market between the OMS and the NMS is significant. While 
in the OMS the share of financial institution bonds was 53 per cent of GDP, in the 
NMS it was merely 5 per cent of GDP at the end of 2004.  
In the EU-25 the corporate bond market was equivalent to only 5.6 per cent of 
GDP at the end of 2004. At the same time the average was over one percentage point 
higher for the OMS countries, while in the NMS the corporate bond market 
practically does not exist as it is equivalent to only 1.5 per cent of GDP.  
Although the corporate bond market is still not very large within the EU, it has 
been growing in most member states as corporations have increasingly been exploring 
the opportunities for direct financing with better funding conditions. The switch to 
debt markets was accompanied by increased financing needs, which were related to 
new technologies and an intensive period of mergers and acquisitions. According to 
Hartmann et al. (2003) and Rajan and Zingales (2003) the surge in corporate bonds 
may also be a consequence of EMU and the introduction of the euro. Our data are 
consistent with this theory as they show that the largest increase in the importance of 
the corporate securities domestic debt market was in those member states that also 
introduced the euro. 
Besides the introduction of the common currency, the corporate issuance of 
debt instruments was also encouraged by banks as a result of new BIS regulations and 
stronger competition in the financial system: European financial intermediaries were 
helping their existing customers obtain direct access to the capital market. 
Consequently it is hard to distinguish whether the recent changes in corporate finance 
towards debt securities have been driven either by market changes, corporate 
restructuring or the banks themselves (Pagano et al., 2004). 
In the NMS, especially in the transition economies, the bond market for non-
financial corporations is still very tiny. Nevertheless, in most of these countries the 
government has recently made efforts to develop the debt market. For example, in 
Poland the legal barriers have been eased. Moreover changes in the pension system in 
those countries should create demand for corporate bonds, and enhance new issues in 
the long-term. 
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A recent trend in European capital markets is the creation of stock exchange 
networks. A very large European market is forming: its main components are 
Euronext, connecting the Amsterdam, Paris, Brussels and Lisbon stock exchanges, 
and the Nordic and Baltic stock exchange, which combines the markets of Sweden, 
Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Denmark. Stock exchange networks satisfy 
the needs of companies seeking to broaden their shareholders’ base and raise capital 
beyond local markets. Together with the need of setting up a new or renewed stock 
exchange, this is what has probably induced the small countries of Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania to join the Nordic and Baltic alliance. It may be the only way they 
could avoid an almost sure decline of the local market, undermined by the migration 
of the best companies through cross-listing in international markets5. 
Another characteristic of stock exchange networks is their higher efficiency, 
granted by extended trading hours, the possibility of remote membership, lower 
transaction costs and greater information. All in all, an integrated European stock 
exchange market should lead to greater efficiency. In the future network externalities 
may contribute significantly to increasing EU-25 capital markets size and activity. 
5. OTHER FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES  
The enlargement of the EU-25 accelerated the process of financial integration and is 
already evident in the banking industry and capital markets. The developments in 
each of these main areas have been summarized above emphasizing that the extent of 
integration across markets is not uniform. The variation is also visible in the case of 
other financial intermediaries, as mentioned in Section 2. 
Insurance companies, investment funds and pension funds are notable features of 
OMS financial system, while in the NMS these financial institutions have only 
marginal importance. In part this is due to the breadth of activities and the historically 
strong position of universal banks. The development of these financial intermediaries 
is strongly connected with the problem of aging of the population and ongoing 
pension system reforms. 
Within the EU-25 the total investments of insurance companies represented 48 
per cent of GDP in 2004, an increase of almost 10 percent since 2001 (Table 4). In the 
                                                 
5 In the last decade, before the emergence of the European stock exchange networks, cross listing on 
US stock exchanges was very popular among export-oriented and high tech European companies. 
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NMS the increase was especially significant: total investments of insurance 
companies increased almost 30 per cent over the years 2001-2004, mainly because of 
an increase in spending on life insurance. The per capita life insurance premiums have 
increased by 37 per cent since 1996 and were equal to €776 in 2003, yet there is a lot 
of cross-country variation in the average life insurance spending in the EU-25 (Swiss 
Re, 2000; 2004). 
Also investment and pension funds have become a powerful factor in the 
financial services industry as a result of changes in saving patterns caused by 
demographic changes and decreasing yields on bank deposits and other traditional 
financial instruments.  
Owing to favorable tax treatment the assets under management by investment 
and pensions funds are already comparable in some countries to those of the banking 
industry. The growth of investment and pensions funds was encouraged also by credit 
institutions and insurance companies as asset management makes up an important 
share of their non-interest income. Nevertheless, there is still significant potential for 
growth as weighted average assets managed within the EU-25 without Ireland and 
Luxembourg amount only to 29 per cent of GDP in 2004 compared to 70 per cent in 
the US. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In drawing our conclusions about the characteristics of the European financial system, 
we will briefly compare it to the financial structures in the US and in Japan. 
Our first conclusion, in line with related work on financial structures (Allen et 
al., 2004; Hartmann et al., 2003; Allen and Gale, 2000), is that the European financial 
system is bank based: in the US, on the contrary, the capital markets (including the 
bond markets) play the larger role in the financial system. The importance of banks in 
the US economy is lower than in Japan and even smaller than that of NMS. Thus, the 
US financial structure may be described as market based. The Japanese financial 
structure can be described as bank based, even if the size of the stock market is larger 
than that of the banking system: in fact the capital market is still underdeveloped, if 
we exclude public bonds. 
Also considering the results of previous studies, we conclude that the main 
characteristics of the financial structure of the EU-25 have not changed in spite of the 
enlargement. In addition our results show that the existing differences in financial 
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structures across the most important economic regions and countries have not been 
affected in the last decades. 
Among the characteristics of the banking system, we have observed a high 
level of concentration, in particular in NMS. This has led to an increase in the 
European average, that is higher than the value of the concentration index for the US 
and Japan, probably because of a low level of integration and low foreign bank 
penetration in OMS. The recent wave of European cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions may lead to a decrease in the concentration of the banking sector in the 
long term. 
Regardless of this high concentration, the European banking sector, in 
particular in OMS, is more efficient than that of the US. The factors behind the high 
inefficiency of the banking sector in the NMS and US are quite different: in the NMS 
the ratios were driven mainly by the transition economies, because of high interest 
rates, due to bad loans, and high overheads costs, caused by excessive employment 
and low application of modern technology6. In the US the high overhead costs are 
mainly due to a still large number of small banks despite the merger boom of the last 
decade. The significant difference in net margins between the US and other countries 
reflects divergences in bank activity, rather than in efficiency or competition. In the 
US banks are more focused on short-term and consumer financing, while in Europe 
and Japan they are more commercially based and long-term oriented. 
In Japan the degree of concentration in the banking sector is between the level 
observed in the US and the EU-25. However, the efficiency of Japanese banks is close 
to that of the OMS. The Japanese banks have the lowest overhead costs, while net 
margins are comparable to the lowest in the OMS. Thus, we may deduce that the level 
of banks efficiency is affected by the degree of financial development. 
As anticipated, the stock and debt market in the US is more active and 
efficient than that in the EU-25 or Japan. The Japanese stock market is larger than the 
European one, but smaller, less active and efficient than the average stock market in 
the OMS. Moreover, the structure of the debt market varies significantly across 
countries: in Japan and EU-25 it is dominated by government bonds, while in the US 
                                                 
6 Recent studies present evidence that the efficiency of banks has been increasing in transition 
economies in recent years see Bonin et al. (2005) and Fries and Tacit (2005). 
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the larger role is played by financial bonds. The European corporate debt market is 
the smallest when compared to the US and Japan.  
We conclude the comparison examining insurance corporations and pension 
funds, both of which have grown in recent years in all countries. Nonetheless, 
insurance corporations are more important in Japan and, to a lesser extent, in the US. 
In the EU-25 insurance corporations and pension funds still don’t play a significant 
role, particularly in the NMS, due to the importance of public pension schemes. 
Summing up, financial systems differ a lot among countries; divergences are 
higher when comparing European countries with the US and Japan. Differences 
emerge also between OMS and NMS. The important differences between the OMS 
and the NMS need to be taken account of by policymakers going forward. For 
example, prior to the enlargement foreign banks played an important role in very few 
countries. Thus policies such as supervision by a bank’s home regulator could be 
readily justified. Now, however, with foreign banks important in so many countries 
this is not so clear. On the other hand, as NMS catch up and converge, differences in 
financial systems may decline. On the other hand they may not. We strongly believe 
that more research on European financial integration is needed in order to understand 
the structural changes in the financial system caused by the accession of new member 
states. 
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Figure 1: Comparison of economic strength and growth  
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Figure 2 Assets of financial intermediaries as per cent of GDP in 2002 
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Figure 3 Bank sector vs. Stock market (as per cent of GDP), average 1995-2004 
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Figure 4 Legal determinants of financial activity in the EU-25 
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Table 1 Total assets, credits and deposits of CI as per cent of GDP
 Total assets Total credits Total deposits 
 1995 2004 1995 2004 1995 2004 
Austria 213.3 268.0 94.0 125.1 85.0 97.9 
Belgium 291.2 322.3 74.7 107.2 74.6 142.8 
Cyprus 85.9 305.9 80.2 141.1 86.7 126.8 
Czech Republic 132.1 99.7 70.7 38.7 62.2 69.2 
Denmark 118.0 309.3 n/a 164.4 53.7 62.2 
Estonia 35.9 94.4 14.0 65.4 16.3 45.8 
Finland 117.0 141.9 66.0 69.4 54.2 53.2 
France 173.1 267.9 101.9 92.9 65.8 77.0 
Germany 205.0 29.7 n/a 135.8 62.4 113.3 
Greece 98.0 137.9 33.6 76.4 57.1 95.6 
Hungary 36.1 80.1 22.5 48.3 40.2 44.4 
Ireland 129.4 486.4 70.3 176.2 65.9 122.7 
Italy 139.0 168.4 95.6 88.0 57.3 58.0 
Latvia 31.0 101.3 7.1 56.5 16.6 65.7 
Lithuania 27.9 47.5 14.3 30.4 14.3 30.1 
Luxemburg 2876.0 2708.5 n/a 467.3 n/a 859.4 
Malta 177.9 476.8 95.8 200.1 114.5 204.9 
Netherlands 216.0 343.3 112.5 174.1 77.9 122.4 
Poland 48.8 67.6 17.3 34.8 25.7 45.6 
Portugal 158.0 242.5 70.5 136.8 76.1 102.2 
Slovakia 76.0 87.7 36.7 36.3 54.9 21.7 
Slovenia 61.1 93.6 25.7 47.3 31.7 56.7 
Spain 159.0 205.0 102.3 120.6 73.6 104.4 
Sweden 152.0 208.9 114.1 114.5 40.4 51.2 
United Kingdom 239.0 406.4 122.3 142.2 72.4 117.6 
EU-25 average a 181.7 215.1 71.6 114.5 63.4 94.3 
OMS average a 187.6 219.1 76.5 119.9 65.8 96.9 
NMS average a 66.6 84.7 31.8 41.9 38.4 50.6 
Source: ECB, National Central Banks and Eurostat n/a= not available 
a GDP in PPP terms weighted averages 
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Table 2 Structure of the banking sector
 Number of CI 
Asset share  
of foreign CI CR-5 HHI 
 1997 2004 1997 2004 1997 2004 1997 2004 
Austria 995 796 3.4 19.4 48.3 43.8 515 552 
Belgium 131 104 30.4 23.2 54.0 84.3 669 2100 
Cyprus n/a 14 10.2 30.1 91.6 69.4 2747 1365 
Czech Republic 50 74 24.0 91.8 67.0 64.0 2533 1103 
Denmark 213 202 4.5 16.2 70.0 67.0 1431 1146 
Estonia 12 9 29.0 98.0 83.0 98.6 4312 3887 
Finland 348 363 8.4 59.5 88.0 82.7 2150 2680 
France 1,258 897 10.4 11.4 40.0 44.7 449 623 
Germany 3,420 2,148 4.3 6.3 17.0 22.1 114 178 
Greece 55 62 15.8 24.8 56.0 65.0 885 1069 
Hungary 286 217 53.0 77.0 53.0 52.7 2101 795 
Ireland 71 80 24.8 45.4 41.0 43.9 500 556 
Italy 935 787 7.0 7.7 31.0 26.0 201 230 
Latvia 37 23 55.0 57.8 51.0 62.4 1450 1021 
Lithuania 37 74 41.0 93.0 84.0 78.9 2972 1854 
Luxemburg 215 162 92.5 94.1 23.0 29.7 210 304 
Malta n/a 16 47.1 39.1 98.0 78.7 4411 2015 
Netherlands 648 461 7.2 12.1 79.4 84.0 1654 1726 
Poland 1,378 653 15.3 67.6 46.2 50.2 859 692 
Portugal 238 197 14.8 26.1 46.0 66.5 577 1093 
Slovakia 29 21 30.0 97.0 63.0 66.5 2643 1154 
Slovenia 34 24 5.0 38.0 62.0 64.1 2314 1425 
Spain 416 346 12.5 11.5 45.0 41.9 285 482 
Sweden 237 212 2.5 8.7 59.0 54.4 830 854 
United Kingdom 557 413 52.2 51.3 24.0 34.5 208 376 
EU-25 average a 504 334 20.3 29.2 33.3 44.8 389 670 
OMS average a 640 482 15.8 19.0 33.0 44.6 370 662 
NMS average a  233 113 23.0 70.4 61.3 60.3 2024 1087 
Source: ECB, National Central Banks and BankScope n/a= not available 
a credit institutions assets weighted averages 
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Table 3 Indicators of banking sector performance 
 NIM Overhead costs Cost/Income ROA 
 1997 2003 1997 2003 1997 2003 1997 2003 
Austria 1.82 1.80 1.69 1.63 66.95 65.62 0.25 0.41 
Belgium 1.74 1.40 1.29 1.33 66.08 67.72 0.65 0.45 
Cyprus 2.24 2.51 2.13 2.29 63.37 67.39 0.75 -0.06 
Czech Republic 3.61 2.54 2.66 2.52 53.37 61.48 0.44 1.28 
Denmark 1.97 1.36 1.36 0.90 58.87 52.64 0.84 0.58 
Estonia 6.14 4.03 3.92 2.80 53.12 52.86 3.64 2.17 
Finland 3.62 1.92 1.99 2.09 57.15 59.06 1.50 1.00 
France 1.62 1.15 1.73 1.47 72.01 67.37 0.31 0.40 
Germany 2.31 1.86 1.67 1.44 62.48 65.93 0.30 0.18 
Greece 2.5 3.51 2.63 2.59 64.66 59.89 0.71 0.94 
Hungary 5.05 4.62 4.23 4.01 65.81 63.15 1.75 1.73 
Ireland 2.27 1.29 1.91 0.85 60.14 51.83 0.92 0.68 
Italy 2.87 2.99 2.68 2.46 73.73 69.59 0.36 0.75 
Latvia 6.34 3.1 5.57 3.18 65.32 60.68 3.27 1.41 
Lithuania 7.16 3.42 6.14 3.39 80.07 79.98 -0.22 1.27 
Luxemburg 0.79 0.68 0.62 0.78 46.4 54.53 0.56 0.54 
Malta 2.45 2.00 1.67 1.49 53.22 47.11 0.93 1.08 
Netherlands 1.93 1.63 1.91 1.72 72.21 70.34 0.58 0.47 
Poland 5.61 3.38 3.35 3.84 55.04 68.36 1.97 0.43 
Portugal 2.79 2.23 2.22 1.79 59.88 61.06 1.05 0.79 
Slovakia 2.63 3.58 3.52 3.28 79.08 70.73 -1.26 1.34 
Slovenia 4.48 3.29 3.61 3.06 59.15 64.12 1.11 0.88 
Spain 3.16 2.75 2.46 1.95 61.58 54.31 0.89 0.94 
Sweden 1.48 1.54 0.93 0.94 50.56 49.48 0.48 0.65 
United Kingdom 1.93 1.69 1.75 1.77 60.75 61.03 0.66 0.63 
EU-25 average 3.14 2.41 2.55 2.14 62.44 61.85 0.90 0.84 
OMS average 2.19 1.85 1.79 1.58 62.23 60.69 0.67 0.63 
NMS average 4.57 3.25 3.68 2.99 62.76 63.59 1.24 1.15 
Source: BankScope 
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Figure 5 Domestic stock market capitalization as per cent of GDP a 
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Figure 6 Total value equities traded as per cent of GDP a 
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Figure 7 Domestic debt market as per cent of GDP, 1995-2004 a 
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Table 4 Total investments of insurance companies and total assets under 
management as per cent of GDP 
 Insurance companies Pension funds Investment funds 
 1995 2004 1995 2004 1995 2004 
Austria 26.6 28.8 3.7 4.3 45.3 51.7 
Belgium 45.5 57.7 5.7 4.1 34.1 33.4 
Cyprus n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Czech Republic 7.2 9.3 2.4 3.7 4.0 4.3 
Denmark 53.8 63.3 23.3 192.8 21.2 39.2 
Estonia 2.3 3.4 0.0 1.9 n/a 3.5 
Finland 23.7 25.5 n/a n/a 9.0 14.4 
France 55.9 59.9 0.0 0.0 43.3 48.5 
Germany 44.6 49.3 n/a 11.7 37.6 38.9 
Greece 9.2 7.2 0.0 0.0 13.2 9.5 
Hungary 4.9 4.4 4.0 6.6 5.0 5.3 
Ireland 48.2 58.2 43.7 42.0 242.7 292.5 
Italy 25.2 29.4 0.5 0.9 31.5 20.8 
Latvia 2.2 2.0 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.5 
Lithuania 1.6 2.3 0.0 0.1 n/a n/a 
Luxemburg 130.0 130.3 n/a n/a 3,878.3 3,797.9 
Malta 10.9 13.9 0.0 0.0 13.0 23.5 
Netherlands 66.3 65.8 100.8 106.9 25.1 20.1 
Poland 5.1 7.1 2.7 7.9 1.7 4.7 
Portugal 20.6 24.6 11.5 10.7 19.8 21.9 
Slovakia 5.6 7.2 n/a n/a n/a 5.0 
Slovenia 6.0 8.9 0.9 2.0 11.5 8.0 
Spain 21.9 24.3 6.6 7.7 23.3 24.8 
Sweden 0.1 31.3 0.0 0.0 35.6 42.1 
United Kingdom 108.6 95.0 73.6 64.5 22.6 24.8 
EU-25 average a 46.6 48.3 17.6 21.9 39.6 41.0 
OMS average a 50.3 52.2 19.0 23.5 42.9 44.4 
NMS average a 5.2 6.7 2.3 5.4 2.8 4.6 
Source: ECB, National Central Banks and Eurostat n/a= not available 
a GDP in PPP terms weighted averages 
 
